Building Resilience and Social Cohesion in Conflict

Pamela Aall
U.S. Institute of Peace
Chester A. Crocker
Georgetown University

Abstract
Examinations of the effectiveness of diplomacy in conflict resolution generally focus on official political institutions and the roles that they play. This article takes a different tack and focuses on the social institutions and groups that exist in and are affected by a conflict environment. This article argues that conflict resilience—which we define here as the ability to resist and recover from conflict—and its ability to contribute to social cohesion are key dimensions of the ability to manage conflict in the types of conflicts that are prevalent in the world today. We examine several different definitions and examples of conflict resilience, and identify actions that outside actors can take to support resilient institutions and groups, particularly in the areas of supporting effective domestic institutions, promoting inclusion and encouraging good leadership.

The ability to prevent or resolve conflict is a bit like gardening—an interaction of many factors, some involving the gardener, others the plant and still others the environment. The gardener needs a few basic implements—perhaps a fork, a spade, and a hose—as well as skill in the planting and tending. However, much also depends on the sun, soil and rain conditions of the general environment surrounding the garden. Complicating matters, the garden exists in a micro-climate—the conditions of the immediate patch of ground differing from the larger environment in consequential ways—which may also determine whether the plants live or die. Other factors include what kind of plant is selected and its basic health, the types of threats from insects and disease, and the remedies available. It adds up to a complex system, some parts of which can be controlled by the gardener and others of which are dependent on factors far out of the gardener’s reach.

Conflict prevention and resolution also depend on a complex mixture of attributes of the peacemaker, the conflict, the environment, and factors which lie outside anyone’s ability to predict or control. Most analytical work on conflict prevention and resolution focuses on the direct parties to the conflict. This article will pull the camera back to focus on the larger picture, and particularly on the role that social institutions—the surrounding environment—play in helping to aggravate conflict or to dampen it down. Our concern is with the resilience of those institutions and their ability to foster social cohesion in the face of conflict. We concentrate on the social institutions and groups that exist in any conflict setting but are not the principal actors.

The social environment of conflict encompasses an open ended universe of factors and resources composed of societal actors, norms, and institutions that shape social attitudes toward peace and conflict. Understanding the role that this wider society plays presents a number of challenges, not least because ‘wider’ society is a broad concept. They include both official and informal institutions—organized civil society, religion, education, the security sector, legal norms and traditions, identity groups, affinity groups, private enterprise, the media (old and new), women’s groups, and youth groups. Some of these groups and institutions will have a significant impact on conflict; this influence may be constant throughout the conflict or may wax and wane over time.

How these institutions and groups interact with political, economic, and demographic stresses and what impact they have on societal stability is an important element in understanding conflict, but one that receives far less attention than the actions of heads of conflict parties and their militaries. These institutions, however, are often critical in setting social attitudes toward these leadership groups and toward the issues that underlie the conflict. This article suggests that resilience—which we define as the ability to resist and recover from conflict—and its ability to contribute to social cohesion are key dimensions of the ability to manage conflict in the present world disorder (Aall and Crocker, 2017).

Conflict and social stress
A portrait of the current international environment presents a picture of division on nearly all dimensions—political, economic, social, religious and cultural. The past consensus on the main ideas of a global liberal order seems like a
distant dream; there are deepening social divisions between ethnicities, religions, young and old, rich and poor, urban and rural, and proponents of economic growth or environmental protection. Positions are polarized, and compromise and deal-making gain little purchase under these circumstances. A number of states such as Syria, Libya, South Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, Central African Republic, and Myanmar have been torn to pieces by identity based forces—often exploited by political actors—as allegiance to tribe, sect, and religion prove stronger than the allegiance to the state. While conventional war between states has decreased substantially since 1945, the continued tension between the nuclear and nuclearizing powers raise concerns about an outbreak of conflict involving Iran or North Korea.

Other kinds of conflicts are more difficult to characterize. For instance, a number of states engage in proxy warfare: Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen; Iran, Russia and the United States in Syria; Russia in Ukraine; the US and others in the fight against terrorism (Byman, 2018). These wars mix local actors and powerful state sponsors, and often reflect a variety of agendas, rules of engagement, and shifting alliances. In these proxy wars, it is difficult to know who is making decisions and for what reasons and this ambiguity breeds distrust in all parties. In a related development, recent years witnessed heightened recourse to nonviolent forms of coercion, whether in the form of people power strategies or the use of irregular and hybrid war tools that may feature non-violent uses of covert and illegal tools of influence and aggression (Brands, 2016; Wells, 2017; Wilkenfeld et al., 2019).

Given these global circumstances, it is remarkable that a number of conflicts over the past 30 years have come to an end in, for instance, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia and South Africa. It is also striking that the 2018 Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace ranked several countries in unstable areas in the top 40 countries (out of a total of 163) in their index: Bhutan (19), Botswana (29), Sierra Leone (35), and Madagascar (38). Looking at their neighbors emphasizes contrasting situations: Bhutan’s neighbor India is ranked at 136, Botswana’s neighbor Zimbabwe is ranked at 124, Sierra Leone’s neighbor Guinea ranks 96, and the relatively stable Mozambique, just across the Mozambique Channel from Madagascar, still clocks in at 86 (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2018).

Explanations for the difference between these neighboring countries are both multidimensional and context specific, and include enlightened leadership, a degree of economic stability, legitimate governance, a functioning justice system and, at times, help from the international community. But the ability to manage conflict is not only a function of official institutions or organized groups. It also is a function of the wider society and its capacity to absorb stresses that might damage other systems and lead to widespread violence and conflict. In other words, it is a function of that society’s resilience.

Three models of resilience

Resilience is a concept that has fairly substantial roots in psychology, the physical sciences and development. All definitions emphasize the ability to deal with stress without breaking. That said, there are many different ways of dealing with stress, each of which produces a different outcome. In the development field, it is particularly applied in the area of preparing for natural disasters. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for instance, emphasizes the systemic aspect of resilience, defining it as ‘The ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation, restoration or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions’ (World Bank 2013, p. 4). The field of psychology, on the other hand, stresses the resilient capacities of individuals in the face of trying or traumatic circumstances (Underwood, 2018). The business community views resilience as the ability to overcome challenges to productivity. The Frontier Strategy Group, for instance, developed a Sub-Saharan Africa Resilience to External Shocks Index (RESI) which assesses markets’ socioeconomic fundamentals and internal strength by looking at measures of political stability, trade exposure, economic diversification, wealth, and productivity (Rosenberg, 2016).

The concept of resilience is fairly new to the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, but has been incorporated into a number of country studies looking at the intersection of stress and conflict (Coleman and Lowe, 2007; Fitzpatrick and McWilliam, 2013). A broader view equating the steady state that societies would like to retain with peace was put forward in a US Institute of Peace report, which defined a resilient system as ‘...one that is able to absorb, adapt, or transform itself through self-organization and learning to maintain its basic function (peace) in response to violent shocks and long-term stressors buffeting the system’ (Van Metre and Calder, 2016). Linton Wells identifies a spectrum of resilience types over time: ‘proactive pre-crisis preparations and risk mitigation, effective incident management, and leveraging whatever shocks occur to build back better’ (Taleb, 2014; Wells, 2017).

It is perhaps helpful to look at three interpretations of resilience, recognizing that each of them has relevance to the ability to resist or recover from conflict (Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011). One view comes out of engineering work and emphasizes physical properties which allows an object to retain its original shape despite being subject to significant pressure. A soft rubber ball is resilient when it returns to its original round shape even after being squeezed hard enough to change its contours. A community is resilient when it rebuilds after a natural disaster, as New Orleans did after Hurricane Katrina. A country is resilient when it emerges from conflict with its basic political, economic and social systems intact, despite the damage imposed by war. In many ways, Britain after World War II is an example of this resilience, although social forces that...
would change British society, and especially its class system, were in fact afoot. This view of resilience emphasizes the ability to return to the status quo ante, and highlights the enduring nature of political institutions, social relationships, and economic patterns.

A second view of resilience underlines the adaptive qualities of the entity, person or system. In adapting to new circumstances, the entity involved still retains much of its original identity. After a forest fire, the forest renews. But the new plants are often different from the old ones, and, according to some studies, chance or opportunity play a big role in determining what grows in the renewed terrain (Norden et al., 2015). After the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, the government with World Bank backing helped homeowners construct houses that were quake resistant, but it also helped fund economic retraining programs to allow inhabitants to find work in a society that had been upended by natural disaster (World Bank, 2018). The U.S. socioeconomic system proved resilient during the presidencies of both Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt who championed adaptations that addressed vulnerabilities of the existing market mechanisms and strengthened the basis for social cohesion amidst dire economic times. In Africa, one can point to the willingness of some leaders to step down and respect term limits (even where there were none)—thus setting an example to successors—as signs of adaptable resilience.

A third view of resilience involves a far more radical shift, resulting in a complete change in the structure and modes of operation from the original state. While there may be a systemic transformation, however, the basic purpose of the enterprise remains the same. The history of the Amana Colony in Iowa provides a historical example. This colony of German religious believers who had fled Germany because of persecution settled around Iowa City in the mid-19th century. They lived a largely communal, self-sufficient life until the depression in the 1930s. With the overriding desire to maintain their community, they decided in 1932 to form a for profit organization (which became the Amana Corporation) as their principal means of gaining wealth, moving in one giant step from their old way of life. The Amana communities were preserved but only with a systemic transformation which allowed them to participate in a much larger economy than they could under their original small-scale and self-sufficient model. The idea of resilience encompassing growth and renewed strength can be visualized by reference to the post-World War II reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan and the efforts to build a new South Africa after the dismantling of apartheid.

It is important to recognize that resilient societies are not necessarily peaceful, democratic or efficient. Not all systemic transformations lead to sunny uplands of peaceful progress, as the cases of Libya and Russia illustrate. Many authoritarian regimes seem resilient, at least until they crack under pressure. In other cases, resilience can restrain action. For example, under the former Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, the country faced significant social upheavals, political turmoil and economic disaster, but did not descend into civil war as did some other post colonial period African states. In the face of this situation, a number of observers recognized the resilience of the Zimbabwean people and institutions (Chitiyo, 2017; Seery, 2017; The Economist, 2017). Some saw this resilience as a negative attribute and criticized Zimbabweans for being passive (News 24, 2017). Others, however, lauded the society’s ability to retain its institutions (however misgoverned) and cohesiveness despite the challenges of the Mugabe regime. In some cases, resilience is a characteristic that can both protect the status quo and block change. When change occurs, this same resilience can protect institutions and sociocultural assets. This dual nature of resilience features in the Zimbabwe example; it is worth noting that although the resilience as preserved institutions, it has done so without leading to significant economic betterment or genuine political opening.

Resilience and social cohesion

Conflict resilience—the ability to resist or recover from conflict—supports social cohesion by preserving institutions, relationships and patterns of behavior that form the foundation of cohesion. The relationship is reciprocal: the presence of social cohesion in a community or society also reinforces resilience by encouraging relationships and areas of cooperation across potential fracture lines. Building resilience can build social cohesion which in turn helps to strengthen the ability to resist and recover from conflict.

With its emphasis on resisting and preserving, resilience is a conservative attribute in the largest sense of the word. As such, it can be a valuable asset in conflict prevention and resolution, especially when it conserves and promotes the best parts of the social, political, cultural and economic identity of original state or society. ‘Best’ of course is a very subjective judgment and disagreement over what is ‘best’ often lies at the heart of conflict and of the difficulties of conflict resolution. This article proposes that in a pre-conflict or conflict situation, what is ‘best’ includes the creation or preservation of social cohesion.

Like the concept of resilience, the notion of social cohesion has been subject to several interpretations (Castree et al., 2013; Putnam, 2000). In terms of understanding the reciprocal nature of the term, the definition of the Canadian government’s Social Cohesion Research Network is useful:

[S]ocial cohesion appears to be based on the willingness of people in a society to cooperate with each other in the diversity of collective enterprises that members of a society must do in order to survive and prosper. Willingness to cooperate means they can and do freely choose to form partnerships and have a reasonable chance of realizing them, because others are willing to cooperate as well. This, of course, implies a capacity to cooperate. (Stanley, 2003)

The discussion also identifies five dimensions of social cohesion: recognition/rejection, belonging/isolation, legitimacy/illegitimacy, participation/noninvolvement, and inclusion/
exclusion. In sum, social cohesion reflects willing cooperation across many types of social interactions, a circumstance which has a correlation with an absence of intercommunal violence even in ethnically diverse societies (Varshnay, 2002).

The role of outsiders in supporting resilience

Recognizing that resilience is important to the efforts of states and societies resisting descent into conflict or providing the basis to recover from conflict is the easy part. Understanding what third parties can do to support the development of resilience is not so easily done. Resilience comes from within a society rather than from the outside. While capacity building and economic and social aid provided by external donors can help encourage it, resilience grows out of the interaction between the society at large and its institutions or ways of managing stress. The rest of this paper will be devoted to examining ways that outsiders can help to promote conflict resilience, or at least avoid diminishing it.

This last point is important. There is much written on the unrecognized or agenda driven consequences of third party involvement in a conflict environment (Fortna and Howard, 2008; Lynch, 2016; Paris, 2002). These works point out the deleterious effect that third party work can have in a conflict situation, often as an unintended result of the intervention, but at times because of the motivations of the intervening force. This is more complicated still in the area of resilience, as a resilient society can be resistant to change as well as resilient in a changing situation. States in turmoil, and fragile and conflict prone states, choose between alternative survival strategies reflecting different types of resilience. Regimes that feel threatened or reject inclusive politics are more likely to adopt a strategy of deterrence and resist outside efforts to build other types of resilience. More open systems, on the other hand, have options to increase resilience ranging from adaptation to reordering of social relations, and may be receptive to outside assistance in the process. The political and diplomatic challenge in these two cases is not so much whether to engage but how to identify the positive aspects of resilience and how to preserve them (Crocker, 2013). In other words, there can be cogent arguments for protecting and safeguarding elements of an existing administrative structure (even parts of the ‘deep state’), depending on the character of the new authorities taking over power. The case of Iraq in the mid-2000s illustrates the risks of abolishing the existing state apparatus and spawning a dangerous political vacuum.

There are at least three areas in which outsiders can be helpful in building resilience—supporting domestic institutions, encouraging inclusion, and engaging with leadership.

Supporting domestic institutions

Even in fragile and conflict prone states, there are often institutions that work. It may be the local markets, the education or justice systems, or a more informal gathering of like minded people bent on delivering services or protecting marginalized groups. These systems may not intersect on a consistent basis with the political leaders or with the conflict, but they provide stability in an otherwise turbulent world. They also have a legitimacy that arises from their deep connection with their societies. They understand the needs, values and cultures of the groups they engage. In some African societies, for instance, there exist nonofficial mechanisms for providing justice which are aimed at restoring—not changing—social relations and the social fabric to their conditions before the conflict (Zartman, 2017). In this way, African traditional methods of conflict management fall squarely in the first model of resilience discussed above—the return to the status quo ante, with some measure of recompense for wrongs committed during the dispute. These methods, which often revolve around banishing miscreants from their community or tribe, work by tapping into a strong cultural preference for tribe and clan over other kinds of relationship. Banishment in these circumstances is as painful to the punished as incarceration and often leads to changed behavior, even though the punishment would seem minor by the standards of a modern legal system.

Customary law courts have provided fundamental support for the justice system in South Sudan, and served as critical means of preserving community cohesion during the country’s vicious civil war. But they are understaffed and underfunded, and not well connected with each other, with local police, or with the national judiciary system (Musila, 2018). Organizing international aid to build up this critical layer of the South Sudan judicial system would increase the country’s badly battered resilience and social cohesion.

Supporting successful local efforts to meet humanitarian crises is another area in which international actors can help to build resilience. An example is a local initiative in Warrap State in South Sudan where the Tonj Area Women’s Association (TAWA), was established in the 1990s to help women with small scale entrepreneurial projects. During the 1998 famine, it was already a well organized network that was able to redirect its efforts to help families in crisis, in the critical six months before the international aid organizations arrived (Walender, 2016). The international funding it received allowed the association to expand their services, establishing a school, a grinding mill, and an active business in cross border (South Sudan and Uganda) cattle trading, and thereby providing education and livelihoods for many people in the community.

It is, however, challenging for outsiders to identify effective local institutions that work, at least at the scale where their involvement makes a substantial difference. There is a tendency on the part of outside organizations to fund the institutions they know. These are often institutions that have been successful in deciphering requirements for accounting and evaluating results that western funders require. Acquiring these skills, however, does not mean that the institutions have strong ties or legitimacy among their local communities. Understanding which institutions best represent the people they serve takes knowledge of the local environment, flexibility and a willingness to put aside the
outside funders’ agendas in favor of strengthening ‘the core infrastructure that is vital for associational life, for civic action and for the amplification of civic voice’ (Srinivasan, 2016, p. 308). It is also important for outside funders to recognize the difference between institutions that have been ‘blessed’ by the national authorities and those that may lack official legitimacy but have informal or traditional legitimacy that grows out of their close ties with the local community.

Encouraging inclusion

Outside actors frequently call for the development of a more inclusive polity as part of a conflict prevention and resolution. Until recently, participants in a peace agreement consisted of men in power and men with guns. These were the direct participants in a conflict and as such had a monopoly on the discussion of settlement terms. While inclusion cannot be readily imposed by outside actors, they do have a range of potential tools for conditioning their relationships on the willingness and ability of regimes to respect the roles and needs of the major groups in society (Call, 2012; United Nations and World Bank, 2018).

In order to understand the challenges of inclusion in a conflict situation, it is important to understand what exclusion is and how it interacts with conflict. Exclusion lies at the heart of a lot of conflict, especially in identity based conflict, from Bosnia and Northern Ireland in the early 1990s to the Central African Republic and Myanmar today. Much has been written about the causes, nature and trajectory of ethnic or identity based conflict (Cederman, 2010; Chua, 2004; Horowitz, 1985; Kaufman, 2001; Toft, 2003; Varshnay, 2002). Individuals have many identities—member of a family, professional role, citizen of a state, and so forth—but one becomes dominant for a variety of reasons. A critical question is why membership in an ethnic or sectarian group becomes the dominant identity. The work of Francis Stewart and her colleagues has highlighted the role of horizontal inequalities as driving motivators of establishing group identity, and in developing hostility between groups. They found that it was not actual discrepancies between groups’ wealth and privilege that resulted in conflict but the perceived inequalities between the two. Two groups could be doing quite well in actual access to political power or wealth, but when one group perceives that another group has privileges beyond their own, it may breed envy and hostility which can lead to conflict (Stewart, 2008).

The increasing salience of identity has led to an insider/outside cast to many of today’s conflicts (Cederman et al., 2010). In these, there is often a common narrative which can run the gamut from relatively mild nationalism to full blown hate speech. This common narrative often involves three elements: the love of the insider, fear of the outsider and anger toward corrupt elites who have been betrayed the interests of the nation (Levinger, 2017). Other negative narratives may appear to be merely rhetorical but under the right circumstances can turn to violence. In this narrative there is nostalgia for a glorious past, disdain for a degraded present and a utopian view of the future. The barrier to the utopian future is often the presence of another group or groups (Levinger, 2013). Every violent situation produces different narratives about the causes and effects of the conflict. Incorporating different narratives is a core task of moving a conflict toward peace. In these situations, the effort is not to deny that there are multiple narratives, but to work on changing the most hostile narratives and the negative attitudes toward others that they engender. With this aim in mind, outside actors have made inclusion the cornerstone on which to construct a more peaceful society; in other words, to lay the foundation for social cohesion and resilience.

Recognition of exclusion’s harmful effects has meant that inclusion is often presented as a prescriptive remedy for conflict or as normative ‘good’ that will help a society become more stable and democratic. Indeed, number of studies have supported the conclusion that including women in peace processes leads to a more sustainable peace (Bell, 2004; Mlinarevic et al., 2015; Paffenholz et al., 2016). Encouraging inclusion in someone else’s society requires diplomacy, both on the official level and within civil society. Forced inclusion or inclusion that is imposed from the outside usually does not work. Quota systems, on the other hand, that arise out of the society itself can be helpful, especially if supported by external actors. After the genocide in Rwanda, the 2003 constitution established a quota for women parliamentary candidates, set at 30 percent. Political parties also set quotas for women candidates. Ten years later, women comprised 64 percent of the legislature. Inclusion, however, does not necessarily bring influence. Despite their numbers, there continues to be doubts about these legislators’ credentials. As a response, UN Women and other agencies instituted training programs in leadership and public speaking, an example of outside actors building the resilience of local institutions and making inclusion more meaningful (UN Women, 2018).

Another aspect that argues for inclusion is the presence of peaceful pockets in otherwise turbulent conflicts. A study of several effective community efforts to preserve peace, even as conflict swept over neighboring regions, points out a common denominator in the action of civilian groups collaborating across conflict lines to maintain stability (Kaplan, 2017). In these circumstances, building inclusion may consist of bolstering capacity and identity of cross cutting groups, based not on ethnicity but on other kinds of identities (for instance youth groups, women’s groups or business associations). UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 on the presence of women in peace processes and 2250 on youth engagement both show international support for this type of inclusion.

A serious challenge to inclusion is the reluctance to talk to the enemy, to groups that hold opposing views, or to groups labeled as terrorists. This dilemma has been captured in the literature on peace versus justice (Mertus and Helsing, 2006) but it has become more critical with the rise of extremist groups whose objective is to replace the cultures, societies and governing networks they oppose. Gray zone warfare also presents challenges. In this warfare,
In this discussion of resilience, it is appropriate to underscore what inclusive leaders do: they take risks to reach out across the political divide; they chart visions of freedom for all people in their society, not just their own constituents; they seek out counterparts with whom it may be possible to build bridges; and they invest in trying to better understand their adversaries in the hope of converting them into allies for peace. Support for these incumbent leaders judged to be ‘good’ may be essential to enable them to walk across domestic or regional minefields (think of Camp David), but should stop short of making them appear to be creatures of foreign powers.

**Implications for policy**

There are several policy implications flowing from the above discussion about supporting local institutions, inclusion and effective leadership. At the heart of the policy work, however, is a recognition of the role that legitimacy plays in fostering resilience and social cohesion. This leads to three policy relevant observations:

- In supporting local institutions, it is particularly important that outside donors recognize that legitimacy comes in various forms, and to tailor their interventions to connect with the relevant institutions.
- To order to promote inclusive politics, outside actors need to walk a fine line between including excluded voices and imposing intrusive normative agendas that could damage the legitimacy of the newly included individuals and groups and lead to their rejection.
- Similarly, in saluting and recognizing publicly the value of legitimate and effective leadership, external actors should build coalitions of other organizations to provide similar backing, as this practice is most effective when it has a broad base of domestic and international support.

This discussion throws into sharp relief the need for outside actors to grapple with the question of how to avoid counterproductive interventions into other’s affairs. Just as supporting civil society activists and nonviolent movements must be helpful without being intrusive so must support for constructive leadership. Support to these entities needs to be managed in order to empower them but not to trigger a backlash or undercut their very legitimacy. Helping to encourage resilience and social cohesion requires a deep understanding of the society in question, but also requires some of the very same elements that are found in resilient societies: trust and cooperation, an ability to think outside the box, an understanding of the society in question, but also requires some of the very same elements that are found in resilient societies: trust and cooperation, an ability to think outside the box, a capacity for flexibility, and a talent for creating informal networks and other ties among the different parts of the social environment. Facilitating bridge-building—often seen as a quotidian job for most diplomats and international NGO workers—might be among the most productive approaches to building resilience and social cohesion, and, through strengthening those elements, to contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of conflict.
References


Author Information
Pamela Aall is senior advisor for conflict prevention and management at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) and a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). She teaches at American University and serves on the board of Women in International Security. She is also a member of the World Refugee Council. Her research interests include conflict prevention and management, mediation and negotiation, non-governmental organizations, and the role of education in conflict. pamelaall@gmail.com
Chester A. Crocker is the James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies at Georgetown University where his teaching and research focus on conflict management and regional security issues. He served as chairman of the board of the United States Institute of Peace (1992–2004). From 1981 to 1989, he was U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs. crockerc@georgetown.edu